

## PLATFORM ECOSYSTEMS: HOW DEVELOPERS INVERT THE FIRM

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## Appendix

### Proof of Proposition 1

Recall from the model setup Eq. (5) that

$$\pi_p = V(1 - \sigma) + \frac{1}{2}v(1 - \delta)k(\sigma V)^\alpha + \delta \frac{1}{2}v(1 - \delta)k^{1+\alpha}(\sigma V)^{\alpha^2} \quad (9)$$

The corresponding first-order conditions w.r.t.  $\delta$  and  $\sigma$  become

$$0 = \frac{\partial \pi_p}{\partial \sigma} = -V + \frac{1}{2}v(1 - \delta) \left[ k\alpha\sigma^{\alpha-1}V^\alpha + \delta\alpha^2 k^{1+\alpha}(N_r)^\alpha \sigma^{\alpha^2-1}V^{\alpha^2} \right] \quad (10)$$

$$0 = \frac{\partial \pi_p}{\partial \delta} = -\frac{1}{2}vk(\sigma V)^\alpha + \frac{1}{2}v(1 - \delta)k^{1+\alpha}(N_r)^\alpha(\sigma V)^{\alpha^2} - \delta \frac{1}{2}vk^{1+\alpha}(N_r)^\alpha(\sigma V)^{\alpha^2} \quad (11)$$

Table A1. Parameter Definitions	
Var	Parameter Definition
$\sigma$	Share of platform (%) opened to developers
$t, \delta$	Time until exclusionary period expires (discount $\delta = e^{-rt}$ )
$\alpha$	Technology in Cobb Douglas production
$K$	Coefficient of reuse
$M_d, M_u$	Market spillovers from developers and users, index sizes of network effects
$N_d, N_u$	Number of developers and users respectively
$p$	Price of individual developer applications $p = v(1 - \delta)$
$\rho$	Technological uncertainty; equal to $1 - \omega$
$v$	Value, per unit, of developer output
$V$	Standalone value of sponsor's platform
$y_i$	Output of a single developer in period $i$ and input to developers in period $i + 1$ with $y_0 = \sigma V$ and $y_{i+1} = ky_i^\alpha$
$\omega$	Probability of success for a given innovation; equal to $1 - \rho$

Multiply Eq. (10) by  $\sigma$  to get

$$0 = -\sigma V + \frac{1}{2} k \alpha v (1 - \delta) \left[ (\sigma V)^\alpha + \delta \alpha k^\alpha (N_r)^\alpha (\sigma V)^{\alpha^2} \right] \tag{12}$$

Denote

$$S := \sigma V \tag{13}$$

Then Eq. (12) becomes

$$S = \frac{1}{2} k \alpha v (1 - \delta) \left[ S^\alpha + \delta \alpha k^\alpha (N_r)^\alpha S^{\alpha^2} \right]$$

or

$$1 = \left( \alpha k S^{\alpha-1} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} (1 - \delta) \left[ 1 + \delta \alpha (k N_r S^{\alpha-1})^\alpha \right] \tag{14}$$

Similarly, Eq. (11) becomes

$$0 = \frac{1}{2} v k S^\alpha + \frac{1}{2} v (1 - \delta) k^{1+\alpha} (N_r)^\alpha S^{\alpha^2} - \delta \frac{1}{2} v k^{1+\alpha} (N_r)^\alpha S^{\alpha^2}$$

Equivalently,

$$\delta = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 - \left( N_r k S^{\alpha-1} \right)^{-\alpha} \right] \tag{15}$$

Denote

$$M := k S^{\alpha-1} \tag{16}$$

Then

$$\delta = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{(N_r M)^\alpha} \right] \tag{17}$$

Then Eqs. (14) and (15) reduce to

$$1 = \frac{\alpha v}{4} (1 - \delta) M \left[ 1 + \delta \alpha (N_r M)^\alpha \right] \tag{18}$$

$$\delta = \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{(N_r M)^\alpha} \right] \tag{19}$$

Substituting (19) into (18), we obtain

$$1 = \frac{\alpha v}{4} \left( 1 + (N_r M)^{-\alpha} \right) M \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 - (N_r M)^{-\alpha} \right) \alpha (N_r M)^\alpha \right] \tag{20}$$

Eq. (20) serves as the basis for our analysis of  $\delta$  and  $\sigma$ .

First, about  $\delta$  as claimed in (i). Denote

$$X := N_r M \tag{21}$$

and view the right-hand side of (20) as a function of  $X$  and  $N_r, f(X, N_r)$ , that is,

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= \frac{\alpha v}{4 N_r} (1 + X^{-\alpha}) X \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{2} (1 - X^{-\alpha}) \alpha X^\alpha \right] \\ &= \frac{\alpha v}{4 N_r} (X + X^{1-\alpha}) \left[ \left( 1 + \frac{1}{2} \alpha \right) + \frac{1}{2} \alpha X^\alpha \right] \end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

Recall  $0 < \alpha < 1$ , which implies  $1 - \alpha > 0$  and  $1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} > 0$ . Therefore, all the terms in the expression of  $f(X; N_r)$  are both positive and monotonically nondecreasing. We have the following properties of  $f(X; N_r)$ :

- (1)  $f(0; N_r) = 0; f(\infty; N_r) = \infty$  for all  $v, N_r > 0$ .
- (2)  $f(X; N_r)$  increases strictly in  $X$  and decreases strictly in  $N_r$ .

Consequently, there exists a unique  $X(N_r) > 0$  such that  $f(X(N_r); N_r) = 1$ . Clearly  $X(N_r)$  monotonically increases in  $N_r$  due to the monotonicity of  $f(X(N_r); N_r)$  w.r.t.  $X$  and  $N_r$ . By further expressing  $\delta$  in terms of  $X$  via (19) and (21),  $\delta = [1 - X^{-\alpha}]/2$ , we see  $\delta$  increases in  $X$ , thus in  $N_r$ . Moreover, the natural bound for interior  $\delta > 0$  requires  $X > 1$ , which is equivalent to  $f(1; N_r) < 1$  due to the monotonicity of  $f$  in  $X$ . By straightforward rearrangement,  $f(1; N_r) < 1$  becomes Condition  $R = (\alpha v)/2/N_r < 1$ . This completes the proof of Part (i).

Now, consider  $\sigma$ . The uniqueness of  $X > 1$  satisfying  $f(X; N_r) = 1$  implies the uniqueness of  $\sigma$ . Indeed, by definitions of  $X, M$ , and  $S$ , we have  $X = N_r M = N_r k S^{\alpha-1} = N_r k (\sigma V)^{\alpha-1}$ . Under condition  $N_r, K > 0$  and  $X > 0$  according to the argument above, we have

$$\sigma = \left( \frac{N_r k}{X} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}} / V > 0 \tag{23}$$

Therefore, it is never optimal for the platform to be completely closed,  $\sigma = 0$  as long as  $v, N_r, k > 0$ . We now demonstrate the monotonicity property of  $\sigma$  with respect to  $N_r$ , or equivalently to  $\delta$ , to complete the proof of Part (ii).

Noticing (23) can be rewritten as

$$\sigma = \left( \frac{k}{M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-2}} / V > 0 \tag{24}$$

We now convert  $f(X; N_r)$  into a function of  $M$  and  $N_r$ . To be more precise, for

$$Q := (N_r)^\alpha \tag{25}$$

define the function

$$g(M; Q) := f(X; N_r) = \frac{\alpha V}{4} \left( M + M^{1-\alpha} / Q \right) \left[ \left( 1 - \frac{1}{2} \alpha \right) + \frac{1}{2} \alpha Q M^\alpha \right] \tag{26}$$

Parallel to previous arguments, we have  $g(0; Q) = 0$ ,  $g(\infty; Q) = \infty$ ; thus, for all  $Q > 0$ , there exists a unique  $M(Q) > 0$  such that  $g(M(Q); Q) = 1$ . The monotonicity property of  $M(Q)$  w.r.t.  $Q$  is thus implied in the monotonicity of  $g(M; Q)$  w.r.t. both  $M$  and  $Q$ .

As for the monotonicity of  $g$ , it is clear  $g(M; Q)$  increases strictly in  $M$ . With respect to  $Q$ , consider the first-order partial derivative

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial g}{\partial Q} &= \frac{\alpha V}{4} \left( -M^{1-\alpha} / Q^2 \right) \left[ \left( 1 - \frac{1}{2} \alpha \right) + \frac{1}{2} \alpha Q M^\alpha \right] + \frac{\alpha V}{4} \left( M + M^{-\alpha} / Q \right) \frac{1}{2} \alpha M^\alpha \\ &= \frac{\alpha V}{4} \left( -M^{1-\alpha} / Q^2 \right) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{2} \alpha \right) + \frac{\alpha V}{4} \frac{1}{2} \alpha M^{1+\alpha} \\ &= \frac{\alpha V}{4} \left[ -\frac{\left( 1 - \frac{1}{2} \alpha \right)}{M^\alpha Q^2} + \frac{1}{2} \alpha M^{1+\alpha} \right] \end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

Clearly,

$$\begin{aligned} \left\{ \frac{\partial g}{\partial Q} > 0 \right\} &\Leftrightarrow \left( M^\alpha Q \right)^2 > \frac{\left( 1 - \alpha/2 \right)}{\alpha/2} \\ &\Leftrightarrow M^\alpha Q > \sqrt{\frac{\left( 1 - \alpha/2 \right)}{\alpha/2}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \left( 1 - 2\delta \right)^{-1} > \sqrt{\frac{\left( 1 - \alpha/2 \right)}{\alpha/2}} \quad \left[ \text{by (19)} \right] \\ &\Leftrightarrow \delta < \frac{1 - \sqrt{\frac{\alpha}{2 - \alpha}}}{2} = \bar{\delta} \end{aligned} \tag{28}$$

Combining equations  $f(X; N_r) = 1$  and  $\delta = [1 - X^\alpha]/2$ ,  $\bar{\delta}$  uniquely determines an  $\bar{N}_d$ .

The monotonicity of  $\delta$  w.r.t.  $N_r$  in Part (i) further yields

$$\left\{ \frac{\partial g}{\partial Q} > 0 \right\} \Leftrightarrow N_r < \bar{N}_d \tag{29}$$

Therefore, we conclude on  $\{N_r < \bar{N}_d\}$  or  $\{\delta < \bar{\delta}\}$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} g(M, Q) = 1 &\Rightarrow M \downarrow Q \quad \left[ g \text{ increases in } M \text{ and in } Q \right] \\ &\Leftrightarrow \sigma \uparrow Q \quad \left[ \text{by (24)} \right] \\ &\Leftrightarrow \sigma \uparrow N_r \quad \left[ \text{by (25)} \right] \\ &\Leftrightarrow \sigma \uparrow \delta \quad \left[ \text{monotonicity of } \delta \text{ w.r.t. } N_r \text{ in Part (i)} \right] \end{aligned} \tag{30}$$

In parallel, on  $\{N_r \geq \bar{N}_d\}$  or  $\{\delta \geq \bar{\delta}\}$ ,  $\sigma \downarrow \delta, N_r$ . Consequently,  $\sigma$  achieves its maximum at  $\delta \geq \bar{\delta}$ ,  $N_r = \bar{N}_d$ . This completes the proof of Part (iii).

By combining Eqs. (19), (21), and (23) under condition  $R < 1$ , we can further express  $\sigma$  as a function of  $\delta$ .

$$\sigma = \left( N_r k (1 - 2\delta)^{1/\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} / V \tag{31}$$

Clearly,  $\sigma < 1$  is guaranteed by  $(N_r k)^{1/(1-\alpha)} / V < 1$ , or equivalently,  $N_r k / V^{1-\alpha} = U < 1$ . This confirms Part (ii) of the proposition. Finally, it is easy to see  $N_r$  monotonically increases in  $N_d$  and  $\omega = 1 - \rho$ , and the proof is complete.