

EDITOR'S COMMENTS

The Reflexive Researcher

An important skill we need to develop as researchers is an ability to reflect on, to understand, to evaluate, and to see the interrelationships among the deep assumptions that underlie our work. If my own experience is any indication, it is a skill that does not come easily. We first need to acquire knowledge that is both broad and deep—knowledge that allows us to understand paradoxically what we know and what we don't know. We then need to have the discipline and courage to stare at the underbelly of our research—to scrutinize it ruthlessly so we can learn more about our subject matter, the strengths and limitations of our research, and more broadly ourselves as researchers and our place within a community of scholars. Being able to reflect deeply on our research is a skill that is difficult to master and sustain. We must hone it assiduously throughout our careers.

In these editorial comments, I address the topic of reflexivity in research. I will first explain what I mean by reflexivity. I will then attempt to show how reflexivity can help us in the conduct of our research. Finally, I will examine some pitfalls of being a reflexive researcher. My motivation is to try to encourage more discussion about and greater engagement in research reflexivity within our discipline. To forestall any accusation that I am throwing stones from a glass house, I admit readily that unfortunately much of my own work reflects that I am not a consummate practitioner of research reflexivity.

At the outset, let me hasten to indicate that this editorial is not another piece of rhetoric on the merits of positivism versus interpretivism. For a start, I find much of the debate about positivism versus interpretivism to be vacuous (a topic for another editorial!). In any event, reflexivity in research has a broader gamut than the hoary old chestnut of positivism versus interpretivism. True, it is informed by this debate, but it is not captured by it.

What Is Reflexivity?

When we reflect on some topic, we try to understand it more deeply. We consider matters like context, assumptions, cultural biases, political influences, and so on. Reflection is difficult. We have to step outside ourselves and look on ourselves as another person might. We have to try to understand ourselves as sentient, social beings and to come to grips with the ways we construct our understanding of the world. The quality of our reflection will depend on the breadth and depth of the knowledge we possess. Absent knowledge, we cannot reflect. We have no basis for gleaming self-insight and enriching our understanding of the world.

Reflection also requires that we stop or at least pause in our research endeavors. It is not hard to understand why scholars racing against a tenure clock might view reflection as a palsy they should avoid at all costs (or perhaps more positively, a luxury they cannot afford). It is sad, however, if we become senior, established scholars and shun reflection—if we are driven by a research and publication agenda that brooks no time for reflection about the long-term value of the research we are undertaking.

Reflexivity (as opposed to reflection) is an even more-difficult affair. It involves seeing the interrelationships between the sets of assumptions, biases, and perspectives that underpin different facets of the research we undertake. In some cases, a dominant worldview may permeate all aspects of our research—for example, a belief that as researchers we have the most-informed, authoritative “voice” to describe the phenomena that are our focus. In other cases, different sets of assumptions might guide the way we conceptualize our research problem, the way we frame our theory, the way we conduct our empirical work, and the way we interpret the empirical materials we gather. Some assumptions may be congruent; others may be contradictory. For instance, we may be seeking to understand how the employees in an organization perceive the threats posed by the implementation of an information system—in other words, we believe they should have the authoritative voice. Unwittingly, however, we then employ a research method that inhibits their freely expressing their concerns and which, instead, foregrounds our own beliefs about what is happening.

In short, when we try to understand the assumptions, biases, and perspectives that underlie one component of our research (e.g., the way we have constructed our theory), we are being *reflective*. Insofar as we try to understand the assumptions, biases, and perspectives that underlie *all* components of our research and, in particular, the interrelationships among them, we are being *reflexive*. As reflexive researchers, we first try to reach a deep understanding of the individual components of our research—our theories, our research methods, our interpretations, and so on. We then try to understand our research as a whole—how the different components fit together and whether the individual components make sense in terms of the whole. We then return to the components and try to reach a deeper understanding of them in light of our understanding of the whole. Next we return to consider the whole, informed by our deeper understanding of the components. And so the hermeneutic circle goes on until we conclude we are no longer able to deepen our understanding of or obtain further insights into the research we are undertaking.

Meta-Theoretical Reflexivity

Some of the most-pervasive and influential assumptions, perspectives, and biases that impact our research arise from the meta-theories we hold. Meta-theories are broad, general ideas that we hold about the world. Either explicitly or implicitly, we frame our views about specific phenomena in the world (e.g., information systems-related phenomena) in the context of these meta-theories.

One set of meta-theoretical assumptions that we hold either knowingly or unknowingly relates to our beliefs about the extent to which phenomena in the world are nomothetic or idiographic. If we hold an extreme nomothetic view of the world, we will undertake our research in the belief that we can discover laws that govern the world—in other words, that we can build theories that provide powerful explanations of and predictions about phenomena in the world. If we hold an extreme idiographic view, we will eschew theory. Indeed, the notion of generalization will be anathema to us, and we may even be skeptical about whether our research is likely to contribute to understanding. Instead, we might argue that at best our research will provide insights (a weaker form of understanding?).

Even if we do not hold an extreme view, a particular view might dominate our thinking. For instance, inevitably we may see the world in a nomothetic light. As a result, we might always seek to develop powerful theories that predict or explain phenomena. We may be intolerant of theoretical anomalies and pursue a force-fit strategy whenever they arise. At times, we may fail to grasp the rich insights that anomalies adumbrate.

If we hold a nomothetic view of the world fixedly, we are also likely to employ particular kinds of research methods—specifically, experiments and surveys. We will use these methods because we will assume, perhaps naïvely, that we can devise instruments (e.g., questionnaires) that provide valid and reliable measures of the phenomena that are our focus. Phenomena that are not amenable to this kind of “instrumental” measurement will escape our notice or be measured poorly.

If we hold an idiographic view of the work fixedly, we are always likely to employ qualitative research methods (e.g., case studies, ethnographies, phenomenographies, ethnomethodologies, hermeneutics) to study phenomena. We will justify our actions by arguing we need the so-called rich, thick, situated descriptions of phenomena. Unfortunately, an important regularity might stare us in the face, but we might miss it because our eyes are blinkered.

Reflexive researchers will try to be aware of the meta-theoretical assumptions they are making about the world. Moreover, they will evaluate the appropriateness of these assumptions in the context of the phenomena that are their focus. For instance, reflexive researchers will take neither an extreme nomothetic view nor an extreme idiographic view of the world. Rather, their stance will depend on the nature of the phenomena they are investigating (perhaps as a function of the extent to which their focus is physical versus social/psychological phenomena). They will formulate and use theory in a way that is sensitive to the phenomena that are their focus, acting aggressively when the phenomena exhibit clear nomothetic properties, and using theory with restraint when the phenomena exhibit clear idiographic properties. They will be pluralistic users of research methods, choosing methods that are well suited to the characteristics of the phenomena they are investigating.

Still other sorts of meta-theoretical assumptions can impact our work. For instance, if we are researchers who work within a post-structuralist ideology, we will tend to frame information systems phenomena from a language perspective, particularly from the viewpoint of how language has been used in metaphorical, figurative, and context-dependent ways. If we are researchers who work within a critical ideology, we will tend to frame information systems phenomena from a power perspective, particularly from the viewpoint of whether hegemony is supported or undermined. On the one hand, conceptualizing phenomena from the perspective of these ideologies can provide us with important insights. On the other hand, allowing these ideologies to dominate our thinking can stultify us. Again, reflexive researchers will be aware of how their choice of ideology impacts the ways they approach their research. They will be prepared to switch ideologies to see whether a richer, more-interesting world opens up for them. They will deliberately challenge and break their world views to engage with other perspectives.

Theoretical Reflexivity

A theory is a particular kind of representation of some phenomena in the world. It comprises constructs, relationships among constructs, and a boundary within which the relationships among constructs are expected to hold (see, for example, my September 2003 editorial statement).

As researchers, theories both liberate and constrain us. On the one hand, we might fail to see certain phenomena in the world in the absence of our knowing particular theories. For instance, if we have never studied agency theory, we are unlikely to perceive certain kinds of interactions between two individuals (e.g., preparation of a project plan by an analyst and a user) as their attempts to mitigate agency costs. Similarly, if we have never studied structuration theory, we are unlikely to see human agency (e.g., the adoption of an information technology) and structure (e.g., the rules and resources available to a programming group) as a dual way of considering a common thing (social action) rather than two separate things.

Sometimes theories are stronger than our intuition. They allow us to make predictions that *prima facie* appear untrue but which empirical evidence subsequently shows have substance. For instance, like many people, I still find several of the predictions of some cosmological theories that are now relatively old to be counterintuitive—for instance, that time does not pass, and that all times (past, present, and future) are equally real.¹ In my own research work on conceptual modeling, the theories I have used have sometimes generated counterintuitive predictions about the utility of certain conceptual modeling practices that are used widely. They have provided me with insights that would not have occurred absent the theories.

Unfortunately, theories can also be used in dogmatic, unthinking ways. For instance, the agency-theory zealot forever sees the world as a conflict between principals and agents. Similarly, the structuration theory zealot forever sees the social world as systems that are produced and reproduced via social actions. The outcome is that they inevitably conclude that agency theory and structuration theory are useful ways to conceptualize the phenomena that are their focus. In due course, use of the theories becomes hackneyed and inhibiting.

Reflexive researchers try to use theories in creative, adaptive ways. They scrutinize phenomena using different theoretical lenses. They understand that any one theory provides only a limited view of the world. Theories never account for everything. Reflexive researchers juxtapose the different perspectives of some phenomena provided by alternative, sometimes competing theories. They compare. They contrast. They assimilate. They are knowledgeable, facile, flexible users of theories.

Reflexive researchers also reflect upon the ways in which the theories they employ relate to other components of the research process. For instance, they will consider the ways in which implicit meta-theoretical assumptions they have made could have limited their choice of theoretical lenses to view the phenomena that are their focus. They will introspect about the implications of relaxing or dropping some of these assumptions on their theoretical work. Likewise, as the strengths and weaknesses of their theories unfold, they will consider the implications for the meta-theoretical assumptions that underlie their work.

Research-Method Reflexivity

We need little experience as researchers to understand that acquiring facility with a particular research method is hard earned. It takes time to internalize the nature and mechanics of the method. It also takes time to become expert with the mechanics in practice. For these reasons, we often see research now undertaken by teams of researchers whose members (1) have expertise in the different research methods needed to undertake the research, and (2) are open to and supportive of one another's research methods. For these reasons, also, we often associate particular colleagues with particular research methods (e.g., this colleague is a fine experimentalist, and this colleague is a superb case-study researcher). Perhaps they have published papers about the research method that we find especially useful. Perhaps they have undertaken research that provides outstanding exemplars of how the research method should be used. Moreover, my experience is that some colleagues become territorial when they observe other colleagues using "their" research method. Pity the long-time experimentalist who suddenly employs hermeneutic research methods, or the long-time ethnographer who suddenly employs a field experiment! One's stripes have first to be won before credibility will be assigned to one's work.

¹Paul Davies, "That Mysterious Flow," *Scientific American*, September 2002, pp. 24-29.

Reflexive researchers do not choose research topics on the basis of a topic's amenability to the research methods with which they have expertise. Rather, they choose research methods that enable them to study phenomena that interest them in meaningful ways. They understand that as researchers our choice of a research method impacts what we see in the world. For instance, experimentalists tend to "see" phenomena that can be measured in experiments—often, nomothetic phenomena that can be measured quickly via instruments that have well-established reputations for valid and reliable measurements. Similarly, ethnomethodologists tend to see phenomena that are manifestations of their research participants' attempts to understand their realities—often idiographic, everyday phenomena that somehow can be evaluated to determine whether research descriptions are faithful representations of research participants' conceptions of reality. Like theories, therefore, research methods provide a lens to view the world. They highlight certain types of phenomena, and they downplay other types of phenomena.

Reflexive researchers also understand that their propensity to use a particular research method leads them to adopt certain meta-theoretical assumptions about the world and build certain types of theories about the world. The so-called positivistic, quantitative research methods are not amenable to studying idiographic, rich, thick phenomena. Instead, they are designed to collect large amounts of data effectively and efficiently so the data can be evaluated to determine whether underlying regularities are present. The thin data they collect command our attention only if regularities are present or the absence of regularities signals anomalies that may be important. Researchers who employ these research methods are led naturally to assume the phenomena that are their focus have nomothetic properties. They are also led to build theories that have predictive power rather than explanatory power.

On the other hand, the so-called interpretive, qualitative research methods are not amenable to collecting large amounts of data that can be subjected to inferential statistical analyses as a means of identifying underlying regularities. Instead, they are designed to obtain detail about phenomena, often in copious amounts, that ultimately require extensive interpretation by the researchers who use them. When they are employed, they lead naturally to accounts that focus more on explanation than prediction. Prediction based on the data obtained via these methods is a tenuous affair because statistical methods often cannot be employed to identify underlying regularities.

Reflexive researchers are adept users of a portfolio of research methods. They are not committed ideologically to only certain research methods. Instead, they see that all research methods have a place. They recognize both the strengths and the limitations of a research method. They understand, also, that research methods lead them to frame and analyze phenomena in certain ways. For this reason, reflexive researchers carefully evaluate the implications of using different research methods to address the research problem that is their focus. Indeed, they try to conceptualize the research problem in different ways based on the different research methods they might use to address it.

Reflexive researchers consider the interplay between the research methods they have a propensity to employ in their work and the sorts of theories they build to account for the phenomena that are their focus. For instance, if they are inveterate users of experiments or surveys, they ask whether they have fallen into the trap of seeing the world only in terms of variance models and nomological nets. If they are inveterate users of interpretive, qualitative research methods, they ask whether they have fallen into the trap of seeing the world only in terms of process theories or whether they are suffering from an endemic "failure of analytic nerve."² They strive to disengage research method and theoretical genre, consider the appropriateness of each within the research context, and reengage the two in more-powerful ways.

²David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction* (2nd ed.), Sage Publications, London, p. x.

Interpretation Reflexivity

Reflexive researchers recognize the need to introspect carefully about the assumptions and biases that underlie interpretations they undertake of data or texts or statistical analyses. They experiment with different interpretations, evaluating the strengths and limitations of each. Again, they recognize the value of contrapuntal "readings" of results—of juxtaposing interpretations to glean more insight about the phenomena that are their focus. They have a repertoire of interpretive techniques that they use astutely.

Reflexive researchers ask whose voice is prominent in a text or some data or some result. Does the research participant's voice dominate? Or does the researcher's voice dominate? Or does some third-party's voice dominate (e.g., the participant's manager or the editor of the journal in which the researcher hopes to publish the results!)? Reflexive researchers ask whether the appropriate voice is prominent in the text or the data or the results. For example, if the researcher is interested in identifying and describing qualitative variations among participants in the ways they perceive their realities, are the participants' voices really present in the text that has been obtained? Or are the participants' voices echoing realities that they believe their manager or the researcher would like to hear? In a similar vein, if the researcher has conducted an experiment or undertaken a survey, does the data really reflect the participants' perceptions or the actions they would take in practice. Or does it reflect an artifact of the research method—for example, a subtle demand effect created unwittingly by the researcher? As a result, do the regularities manifested in the statistical analyses undertaken reflect this demand effect rather than the participants' realities that exist in the absence of the experiment or survey?

Voices also need to be credible. For instance, the reflexive researcher will evaluate whether research participants are in a position to provide texts or data that meet certain criteria (e.g., validity, reliability, confirmability, dependability). Participants may lack sufficient awareness or understanding of a context for their opinions, perceptions, or analyses to be useful in terms of the purposes of the research. Likewise, reflexive researchers may realize that research participants lack the knowledge and understanding needed to reach high-quality interpretations of the phenomena that are their focus.

Reflexive researchers also have substantial self-awareness when they interpret or analyze texts or data. If they are working in an interpretive mode, they understand that meaning can be assigned to texts in many different ways—in other words, they have many degrees of freedom when they interpret a text. They realize that they will have a predilection to interpret the text according to either explicit or implicit expectations that they have about the text. Whether this interpretation is credible (evaluated according to some criteria), however, is another matter. Reflexive researchers also understand that they do not escape problems of interpretation even if they work in a quantitative mode. For instance, even using the same data set, one researcher sometimes cannot replicate the statistical results obtained by another researcher. Somewhere an aspect of the analysis depends on a decision where the researchers, either explicitly or implicitly, have made different choices. They also guard against undertaking shallow interpretations of empirical materials when they can lean on the crutch of statistical methods.

When they interpret data or text or statistical results, reflexive researchers recognize the tyranny of theory. They understand that they will be inclined to see empirical materials as supporting their theories. They will deliberately search out empirical materials, therefore, that disconfirm their theory. They will play the role of devil's advocate with their own theories.

Reflexive researchers also recognize the tyranny of meta-theories. For instance, if they tend to work within a post-structuralist ideology, they understand that they will be prone to interpret empirical materials as metaphorical, figurative, context-dependent statements rather than a reflection of someone's reality. If they work within a critical ideology, they understand that they will be prone to interpret empirical materials from

the perspective of whether a particular stakeholder group has been emancipated or exploited rather than an attempt to use information systems to achieve more-effective and more-efficient outcomes. Reflexive researchers will iterate between interpretation and meta-theory in search of a deeper understanding of the phenomena they are studying.

Some Limitations of Reflexivity

Research reflexivity has its dangers. One is that it can lead to narcissism. We become so enamored with reflexivity that *de facto* it becomes our primary research focus. Our egos become inextricably linked to our ability to show our colleagues that we can tease out and understand the deep assumptions and limitations that underlie our work—that we can truly work as philosophers of science. If we subscribe to more-extreme forms of postmodernism or post-structuralism, I believe we must be especially diligent in guarding against this tendency. If we are not careful, ironically we might adopt a particular form of reflexive genre (brutal destruction) unwittingly, which closes us to other forms of reflexivity and the insights these forms provide.

Moreover, as reflexive researchers we can become self-righteous. Eventually, we start to denigrate (perhaps in subtle ways) the work of colleagues who at least on the surface do not engage in reflexivity—those who tell lucid, straight stories about the research they have undertaken. We begin to dismiss their research as simple-minded and pedestrian. Our own papers become a diatribe on the true meaning of the research that others and we have undertaken. Increasingly, our papers become more abstruse. They become a cacophony of arcane words borrowed from in-vogue philosophers—a signal to others that somehow we have privileged insights about the nature and meaning of phenomena within our discipline. Rhetoric and polemics become our means of attracting attention and establishing our reputation.

Research reflexivity can also lead to nihilism. As we become more adept at reflexivity, we see that our research is limited in more and more ways. The danger is that we become paralyzed. We cannot deal with our inability to escape from the meta-theoretical assumptions that underlie our work, the constraints of the social and scholarly milieu in which we work, the indeterminacy of theory, the limitations of the research methods we use, the assumptions and biases that underlie our attempts to interpret empirical material, the problems that arise because our research participants' have difficulty understanding and interpreting their worlds, and so on. We fear the criticisms and ridicule that will arise if we publish our research.

Alternatively, we become dismissive of any research that claims its results can be generalized. Given the complex context in which all research is undertaken, we argue that every research result is unique. To believe otherwise is naïve. We begin to shun theory and research method. We reject attempts to construct and employ criteria for evaluating the quality of research. We take delight in deconstructing these criteria to show they are ludicrous because of their inherent assumptions and limitations. As researchers, we argue we have a right for our voice to be heard. We should not be subject to evaluations by colleagues that ultimately are spurious and simply serve to reinforce the *status quo*. At least among some of our colleagues, we may be seen as being engaged in certain forms of journalism rather than high-quality research.

Conclusions: The Need for Controlled Reflexivity

I believe strongly in the value of research reflexivity. At the same time, it should be apparent from this editorial and previous editorials I have written that I believe research reflexivity needs to be used in certain ways—ways that are constructive rather than destructive.

On the one hand, my call in this editorial is for more research reflexivity in our discipline. I read many papers, and my sense is that we still do too much research without reflecting deeply on the meaning of what we do. We become ruthless producers of research, driven by a need to publish, no matter what the cost. As I indicated earlier, in some cases our tenure and promotion systems produce and reinforce this behavior. As junior scholars, our survival depends on compliance with these systems. As senior scholars, we then become trapped. We cannot change behaviors that have become ingrained. We become hostage to a system that should have been transitory. We continue to produce large amounts of rigorous but often uninteresting research. Somehow we have to find the key to being highly productive scholars who exercise appropriate levels of reflexivity in our research.

On the other hand, I believe we need to be disciplined in the ways we are reflexive. Just because we reflect deeply on the assumptions, limitations, and biases that underlie our work and the interrelationships among them does not mean that we need to discuss these musings at length in our research papers. We have to guard against self-indulgence in the papers we write. High-quality researchers manifest their reflexivity in subtle ways. They work consistently and expertly within a genre of particular meta-theories, theories, research methods, and interpretive acts. They do not apologize for their choices. Rather, it is clear they are confident that they have made astute choices. It is also clear that they recognize the limitations of their choices. They are not effusive. Their discourse is sharp.

As reviewers and editors, we also need to refrain from self-indulgence and dogmatism. Just because a colleague does not work within the genre that we favor does not mean that we should condemn their research. Rather, we need to reflect ourselves about whether our colleague's choices are reasonable. We must avoid throwaway lines. We ought to argue for an alternative genre only if we are confident it provides much richer, much deeper insights into the phenomenon of interest. In short, as reviewers and editors, we too must be reflexive researchers.

New Arrangements for MISQ Discovery

In the September 1994 issue of the *MIS Quarterly*, Blake Ives as then Editor-in-Chief of the *MIS Quarterly* announced a new department called *MISQ Discovery*. Blake's vision for this department was as follows: "*MISQ Discovery* will be an adventuresome and experimental electronic production. The intent is to foster the creation and electronic distribution of innovative work pertaining to the use of information technology for the creation and dissemination of scholarship."

We have had three articles published in *MISQ Discovery* since its inception: the first in 1996, the second in 1997, and the third in 1998. Each has made important contributions to scholarship within the information systems discipline. Since 1998, however, *MISQ Discovery* has languished. We have had few submissions, even though I believe the need for and importance of *MISQ Discovery* remains.

In this light, I have taken advice from the Senior Editors of the *MIS Quarterly*, and I have also taken advice from some of the original key stakeholders in *MISQ Discovery*. I have decided to try to re-invigorate *MISQ Discovery*. In part, my reason for taking this decision is that we now have an opportunity to support and to promote articles published in *MISQ Discovery* through the alliance that the *MIS Quarterly* has with the Association for Information Systems.

In future, papers published in *MISQ Discovery* will appear in full in the electronic version of the *MIS Quarterly* (*e-MISQ*) maintained at the Web site of the Association for Information Systems (<http://www.aisnet.org>). In this way, readers can access the innovative features of the paper (e.g.,

animations or simulations). As in the past, the title of the paper will appear in the table of contents of the print version of the *MIS Quarterly*. In addition, authors will be required to provide a one-page abstract of their paper. This abstract will appear in the print version of the *MIS Quarterly*.

I am delighted to indicate that Michael Myers will take over as Senior Editor for *MISQ Discovery* effective 1 January 2004. Michael has been a Senior Editor of the *MIS Quarterly* and a member of the *MISQ Discovery* editorial board. In addition, he is an author of an important, well-cited *MISQ Discovery* article on qualitative research in information systems (<http://www.qual.auckland.ac.nz/>). For these reasons, Michael is well qualified to take over responsibility for *MISQ Discovery*.

For those of us who subscribe to the vision of *MISQ Discovery*, it is important that we now support it via submission of papers for review. Ultimately, whether *MISQ Discovery* succeeds or fails depends on whether it maintains a viable stream of publications. In this regard, Michael Myers is currently working to clarify the sorts of contributions we will seek from would-be authors that will be congruent with the vision of *MISQ Discovery*.

Changes to the Editorial Board

On 31 December 2003, the following colleagues complete their terms as Associate Editors of the *MIS Quarterly*: Fran Ackerman (University of Strathclyde), Ben Bensaou (INSEAD), Carol Brown (Indiana University), Elena Karahanna (University of Georgia), Laurie Kirsch (University of Pittsburgh), Ann Majchrzak (University of Southern California), Lars Mathiassen (Georgia State University), Al Segars (University of North Carolina), and Viswaneth Venkatesh (University of Maryland). On behalf of the *MIS Quarterly*, I thank them for the outstanding service that they have provided, and I wish them well in their future endeavors.

I am pleased to welcome Anol Bhattacharjee (University of South Florida), Yolande Chan (Queen's University), Moez Limayem (City University of Hong Kong), Jo Ellen Moore (Southern Illinois University), Mike Newman (Manchester University), Peter Axel Nielsen (Aalborg University), Alain Pinsonneault (McGill University), G. Prem Premkumar (Iowa State University), T. Ravichandran (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute), Vern Richardson (University of Kansas), Radhika Santhanam (University of Kentucky), Mani Subramani (University of Minnesota), and Cathy Urquhart (University of Auckland) as new Associate Editors of the *MIS Quarterly*. Each of these colleagues has been invited to be Associate Editors because of the outstanding review work that they have undertaken for the *MIS Quarterly* in the past and their distinguished research record. I congratulate them on their appointment to the Editorial Board, and I look forward to working with them.

On 31 December 2003, Michael Myers (University of Auckland) and V. Sambamurthy (Michigan State University) finish their terms as Senior Editors of the *MIS Quarterly*. Jane Webster (Queens University) also finishes her term as Senior Editor of *MIS Review*. On behalf of the *MIS Quarterly*, I thank Michael, Samba, and Jane for their very-significant contributions and especially their collegiality, and I wish them every success in their future endeavors. As I indicated above, Michael will be taking on the new role of Senior Editor for *MISQ Discovery*.

It is my pleasure to welcome Bernard Tan (National University of Singapore), Lars Mathiassen (Georgia State University), and Rajiv Sabherwal (University of Missouri, St Louis) as Senior Editors of the *MIS Quarterly*. Bernard, Lars, and Rajiv have been outstanding Associate Editors and Reviewers for the *MIS Quarterly*. Their appointment as Senior Editors is testament to their fine work. I congratulate them, wish them well in their new role, and look forward to working with them.

Weber/Editor's Comments

It is also my pleasure to welcome Dov Te'eni (Tel-Aviv University) as Senior Editor of *MIS Review*. In 2002, the Associate Editors and Senior Editors of the *MIS Quarterly* chose Dov's review paper (published in *MIS Review* in the June 2001 *MIS Quarterly*) as our 2001 paper of the year. Thus, Dov has a close affinity with *MIS Review* and empathy for colleagues who undertake the difficult task of writing review papers. I congratulate Dov, wish him well in his new role, and look forward to working with him.

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